Hero Post 010 | April 24, 2025

India Reviews Indus Waters Treaty: A Historic Turning Point

📅 April 24, 2025
📌 Highlight: TWO Relevant Essay Attached at the end

📅 Context

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, India has decided to initiate the process to review and modify the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960, citing cross-border terrorism and the need for equitable use of its river resources.

🔍 Focus

Understanding the historical background, current developments, and the geopolitical and environmental implications of India’s move to re-evaluate the IWT.

📊 Key Themes

• Treaty renegotiation in light of national security concerns
• Strategic use of river waters as a diplomatic lever
• Long-term implications for India-Pakistan relations

🔢 Timeline: Indus Waters Treaty

• 1947: Partition of India; river water-sharing disputes emerge.
• 1951-60: World Bank mediates between India and Pakistan.
• 1960: Indus Waters Treaty signed by Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan.
  • India gets control over Eastern rivers: Ravi, Beas, Sutlej.
  • Pakistan gets control over Western rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab.
• 2000s onwards: Frequent disputes over Indian projects on Western rivers.
• 2025: Following the Pahalgam terror attack, India formally moves to review treaty obligations.

📈 Why the Review Now?

• Pakistan-based terrorist activities have continued despite multiple diplomatic efforts.
• Growing domestic demand to utilize India’s rightful share of Western rivers.
• Need to align water policies with national security and strategic interests.

🌍 Strategic Implications

• For India:
  • Greater control over water resources.
  • Strategic pressure tool without direct military confrontation.
  • Opportunities for new hydroelectric projects.
• For Pakistan:
  • Potential exacerbation of water scarcity.
  • Economic and agricultural vulnerabilities.
• For the World:
  • Increased focus on water security as a geopolitical issue.

🧰 GS Paper Mapping

🌟 Reflection

Beneath the roaring rivers and treaties carved in old hope, a new current stirs—whispering that sovereignty, like water, must sometimes carve new paths when old channels are poisoned by betrayal.

Essay-1

The Indus Waters Treaty in Suspension: Legal, Strategic, and Regional Implications

Introduction

The decision by India to place the 64-year-old Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) “in abeyance” following the tragic Pahalgam terror attack that claimed 26 civilian lives has opened a new and volatile chapter in South Asian diplomacy. While India justified the move as a response to fundamental changes in circumstances and persistent cross-border terrorism, Pakistan swiftly denounced it as an “act of war.” In a region where water is both a lifeline and a strategic lever, the suspension of the IWT raises serious questions about infrastructural capabilities, legal standing, and geopolitical ramifications.

What Does the Indus Waters Treaty Entail?

Signed in 1960 after a decade of World Bank-brokered negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty is often hailed as a triumph of diplomacy in a hostile neighborhood. The treaty divided the rivers of the Indus basin: India received unrestricted rights over the eastern rivers—Ravi, Beas, Sutlej—while Pakistan secured the western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, Chenab. India was permitted limited use of the western rivers for non-consumptive purposes such as domestic use, irrigation, and hydroelectric generation.

An institutional framework was also established, featuring a Permanent Indus Commission (PIC), neutral expert resolution, and arbitration under international auspices. For six decades, even amid wars and diplomatic crises, the treaty functioned as a rare stabilizing mechanism.

Prior Attempts to Modify the Treaty

Over the years, disagreements arose over India’s hydropower projects, particularly Kishenganga and Ratle in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan alleged that Indian project designs enabled undue control over downstream flows. India, in turn, maintained that all projects adhered to treaty provisions.

Disputes over operational aspects reached international forums. In 2013, the Permanent Court of Arbitration permitted India to complete Kishenganga while placing restrictions on ‘drawdown flushing’. Later, tensions resurfaced over procedural disagreements. In 2023, India issued a formal notice seeking treaty “modification,” citing demographic shifts, rising water demand, climate change, and terrorism.

Thus, the groundwork for the present rupture had already been laid before the Pahalgam attack provided the immediate provocation.

Is Unilateral Suspension Legally Permissible?

Strictly speaking, the IWT cannot be altered or terminated unilaterally. Article XII requires a “duly ratified treaty” between both parties for modification or termination.

The term “abeyance” used by India is not codified under international treaty law. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969—which, while not ratified by India or Pakistan, reflects customary international law—speaks instead of “suspension” and “termination.”

India’s action seems to invoke the principle of “fundamental change of circumstances” under Article 62 of the VCLT, a clause historically interpreted very narrowly by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In precedent cases like the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ emphasized that environmental, political, or demographic shifts must be fundamental and unforeseeable to justify abrogating a treaty.

Experts suggest that India’s stronger legal basis may lie in characterizing its suspension as a “countermeasure” under customary international law—a response to Pakistan’s alleged persistent violations of territorial sovereignty via sponsorship of terrorism.

Infrastructural Capacity: Can India Actually Divert Water?

While India theoretically controls upstream sources of the western rivers, it currently lacks the massive storage and diversion infrastructure required to significantly withhold flows.

Most Indian projects are run-of-the-river hydroelectric plants, offering limited storage capabilities. Nevertheless, India can regulate seasonal flows, particularly during critical agricultural periods, thereby causing acute distress to Pakistan’s farming sector.

Moreover, India could explore ‘drawdown flushing’ more aggressively or redesign new projects with greater storage components, although such moves would require years of construction and significant investment.

In the short term, India’s action may serve more as a potent diplomatic and psychological lever rather than as an immediate hydrological blockade.

Strategic and Diplomatic Implications

The suspension marks a tectonic shift in the India-Pakistan equation. Water, often seen as a stabilizing element in bilateral relations, may now become a flashpoint.

For India:

• It reasserts control over strategic resources.
• It exerts non-kinetic pressure without direct military escalation.
• It signals a tougher diplomatic posture aligned with domestic political sentiment.

For Pakistan:

• It introduces existential concerns over water security.
• It threatens its largely agrarian economy and food security.
• It creates new dilemmas about internationalizing the issue, given weakened global sympathy.

For the international community:

• It highlights the growing significance of water disputes in geopolitics.
• It raises questions about the resilience of mid-20th-century water treaties under 21st-century challenges.

Conclusion

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty reflects a fundamental evolution in India’s regional strategy—one that integrates water security into the broader matrix of national defense and counter-terrorism.

However, the move is fraught with complex legal, humanitarian, and environmental risks. India must navigate these waters carefully, balancing firmness with foresight. Strategic use of river rights must be coupled with long-term infrastructural planning, diplomatic clarity, and humanitarian sensitivity.

The Indus basin, a cradle of civilization, now stands at a new crossroads—one where the currents of history, law, and power converge with unprecedented force.

If peace is to flow again, it must find new channels—wider, deeper, and resilient enough to carry the weight of new realities.

ESSAY-2

We CAN HAVE NUMEROUS TITLES, YET SAME ESSAY CAN BE WRITTEN:

🛡️ Suggested Titles for Second Essay:

1. “The Cracks Beneath the Current: India Reclaims the Indus”
2. “Waters of Discord: India’s Break with a Bygone Treaty”
3. “The Indus Awakens: Shifting Currents in South Asian Diplomacy”
4. “Storm Beneath Still Waters: The Unraveling of a 64-Year Accord”
5. “From Treaty to Tension: India’s Strategic Turn on the Indus”
6. “River of Resentments: How History and Terror Reshaped the Indus Pact”
7. “The Final Ripple: When the Indus Waters Could No Longer Bind”

Introduction

The recent suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) by India, following the horrific terror attack in Pahalgam, signals a tectonic shift in South Asia’s geopolitics. Long regarded as an island of cooperation between two hostile neighbours, the Treaty had, in recent years, shown signs of institutional decay. India’s move to place the agreement in ‘abeyance’ has exposed the accumulated fissures beneath its seemingly steady surface.

Historical Context: The Treaty Amidst Tumult

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in September 1960, was born out of necessity rather than goodwill. Partition had not only divided territories but also severed the intricate British-engineered canal systems of Punjab, sowing seeds of conflict. Water was weaponized as early as 1947, leading to a temporary Delhi Agreement of 1948.

The formal treaty—a product of “long and bitter negotiation” in Nehru’s words—was mediated by the World Bank and ratified amidst fierce parliamentary criticism. Many Indian MPs, particularly from Punjab and Rajasthan, saw it as appeasement to Pakistan. Yet, Nehru defended it as a practical compromise to prevent water wars.

Treaty Structure and Limitations

The IWT allocated India exclusive rights over the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) and Pakistan over the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). India was allowed limited usage of western rivers for domestic, non-consumptive needs and hydroelectricity.

Critically, the Treaty lacked an exit clause. Article XII permitted modification only by mutual ratification, ruling out unilateral withdrawal. India was permitted storage rights of 3.6 MAF—a fraction compared to Pakistan’s rights over 135.6 MAF.

Early Fault Lines and the Politics of Water

Despite the Treaty’s promise, strategic fault lines remained. Ayub Khan’s conciliatory posture during Nehru’s 1960 visit soon gave way to provocations. His 1965 aggression over Kashmir and the construction of the Mangla Dam in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir revealed that water was intricately tied to territorial disputes.

Indian sovereignty concerns simmered when Mangla Dam’s location symbolically trampled India’s claims over Kashmir. Though the Treaty itself was not legally breached, the move deepened mistrust. Internally, the Mangla project stoked East-West Pakistan tensions, eventually culminating in Bangladesh’s birth in 1971.

Twenty-First Century Challenges: Terrorism and Climate

Fast forward to the twenty-first century: terrorism and climate change compounded old tensions. Cross-border attacks—Pathankot, Uri, and now Pahalgam—soured relations irreversibly. Simultaneously, China’s dam projects in the upper Himalayas rekindled fears of weaponizing rivers.

While India remained committed to the IWT, the Kishanganga and Ratle projects reignited disputes. Pakistan accused India of manipulating flows; India asserted compliance within treaty parameters. World Bank-mediated mechanisms failed to resolve the impasse, reflecting the Treaty’s structural limitations in adapting to evolving realities.

India’s Gradual Disillusionment

By 2023, India’s frustration reached a breaking point. It formally invoked the Treaty’s Article XII to demand renegotiation—citing demographic shifts, energy needs, environmental changes, and the persistent threat of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.

Pakistan’s refusal to even discuss modifications exacerbated the situation. India suspended meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission in 2024, signaling a hardening stance. Post-Pahalgam, India declared the Treaty in “abeyance,” marking a decisive departure from Nehruvian restraint.

Legal and Strategic Complexities

India’s use of the term ‘abeyance’ is significant. While not recognized in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it mirrors the concept of ‘suspension’—a legal space short of termination. Under customary international law, suspension can be justified as a countermeasure against material breach, notably when territorial sovereignty is repeatedly violated by cross-border terrorism.

However, unilaterally abrogating the Treaty remains fraught. The International Court of Justice’s precedents—notably in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case—set a high threshold for invoking ‘fundamental change of circumstances.’ Political turbulence alone is insufficient; linkage to the treaty’s core objective is essential.

Hence, India’s measured step of suspension, rather than outright withdrawal, reflects legal prudence alongside strategic assertion.

Infrastructure Limitations and Diplomatic Leverage

In terms of physical capacity, India presently lacks the infrastructural might to completely block Pakistan’s access to western rivers. Its hydroelectric projects are largely run-of-the-river, offering limited storage.

Yet, India can exercise regulatory leverage:

• Fluctuating seasonal flows to create uncertainty.
• Expedited construction of new reservoirs.
• Drawdown flushing techniques to manipulate river behavior.

Such measures could severely disrupt Pakistan’s agrarian economy, heavily reliant on Indus waters.

Diplomatically, India’s move places the ball in Pakistan’s court. Any international sympathy for Islamabad will likely hinge on credible counterterrorism measures—something Pakistan has historically resisted.

Future Trajectories

The suspension of the IWT does not automatically mean collapse. Multiple scenarios loom:

• Renegotiation: A slim but preferable path, contingent on Pakistan’s willingness to engage.
• Managed Tensions: India leverages technical rights without escalation.
• Conflict Risk: Mismanagement or further terrorist attacks could trigger water wars.

India must prepare for long-term strategic resilience—expanding domestic infrastructure, diversifying water management strategies, and engaging multilaterally to shape new norms around transboundary river governance.

Conclusion

The Indus Waters Treaty was a product of a different era—a hopeful experiment in rule-based diplomacy amid mistrust. Its gradual erosion was not sudden but reflected deep-seated structural, political, and environmental transformations.

India’s decision to suspend the Treaty represents a bold reassertion of sovereign rights in an era where non-military measures are becoming instruments of national power. Yet, prudence remains vital. Water, like diplomacy, demands patience, foresight, and adaptability.

If new accords must rise from the storm beneath the waters, they must do so upon sturdier foundations—aligned not merely with old cartographic lines, but with the hard-earned wisdom of history.

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